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Abstract
In the Copenhagen Accord, nations agreed on the need to limit global warming to two degrees
to avoid potentially dangerous climate change, while in policy circles negotiations have placed
a particular emphasis on emissions in years 2020 and 2050. We investigate the link between
the probability of global warming remaining below two degrees (above pre-industrial levels)
right through to year 2500 and what this implies for emissions in years 2020 and 2050, and
any long-term emissions floor. This is achieved by mapping out the consequences of
alternative emissions trajectories, all in a probabilistic framework and with results placed in a
simple-to-use set of graphics.
The options available for carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) emissions in years 2020 and
2050 are narrow if society wishes to stay, with a chance of more likely than not, below the
2 ◦C target. Since cumulative emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases, and particularly CO2,
are a key determinant of peak warming, the consequence of being near the top of emissions in
the allowable range for 2020 is reduced flexibility in emissions in 2050 and higher required
rates of societal decarbonization. Alternatively, higher 2020 emissions can be considered as
reducing the probability of limiting warming to 2 ◦C. We find that the level of the long-term
emissions floor has a strong influence on allowed 2020 and 2050 emissions for two degrees of
global warming at a given probability. We place our analysis in the context of emissions
pledges for year 2020 made at the end of and since the 2009 COP15 negotiations in
Copenhagen.
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1. Introduction
Multiple scientific studies covering a broad range of potential
impacts suggest unconstrained levels of global warming
could have serious consequences. In the 2009 Copenhagen
Accord, many nations agreed to ‘hold the increase in
global temperature below 2 ◦C’ by initiating ‘deep cuts in
global emissions’ (UNFCCC 2009). This was later ratified
in the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010), including
confirmation that the two degrees temperature increase is
relative to the period just before industrial times.
Stabilization of global temperature will likely require
society reducing global emissions of greenhouse gases to
levels that are significantly below present day values. As
the magnitude of global warming is strongly determined by
cumulative emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases, and
notably CO2 (Allen et al 2009, Meinshausen et al 2009),
then emissions of such gases will have to reduce to near zero.
This eventual near-complete decarbonization has been noted
by other authors (e.g. Matthews and Caldeira 2008, Solomon
et al 2009, Lowe et al 2009). Research indicates that having
a high chance of limiting global to 2 ◦C requires greenhouse
gas emissions to peak within the next couple of decades and
then decline with significant and lasting rates of reduction
(e.g. Wigley et al 1996, House et al 2008, IPCC 2007
(their p 15)). Emissions reductions suggested by policymakers
are often expressed as target emissions at specific dates in
the future, with years 2020 and 2050 receiving particular
mention (European Council 2007, G8 2008, UNFCCC 2010).
Year 2020 can be noted as representing a short-term aim.
Year 2050 is sufficiently far ahead that it can be regarded
that many current technologies will have reached the end
of their life-cycle and new technologies may be available,
thus setting a roadmap for longer-term ambition. There
remains uncertainty in the magnitude of key climate processes
and hence representation in quantitative models. For any
suggested future emissions trajectory of greenhouse gases,
assessments of whether it avoids key temperature thresholds
such as 2 ◦C should ideally be presented in terms of
probabilities.
There are already studies analysing the link between
mitigation options and future climate states. Kallbekken
and Rive (2007) use a simple climate model to study the
impact of delaying emission reductions. Their multi-gas
treatment (CO2, non-CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosols)
moves forward capturing of uncertainty by sampling a range
of climate sensitivities, but does not represent uncertainty in
climate–carbon cycle feedbacks. The authors find that a 20 yr
delay in reducing emissions leads to the requirement of a
5–11 times greater rate of emissions reduction to stay below
identical levels of warming. Similarly Vaughan et al (2009)
examine the issue of delay, and use a more comprehensive
range of scenarios, although they only consider CO2 and
do not focus on treating climate model uncertainties. They
find (their figure 4(b)) that to achieve no more than 2 ◦C of
warming requires either rates of emission reduction in excess
of 5% yr−1, or, action (i.e. deviation from business-as-usual
emissions) to have begun before year 2010. If a period of
‘overshoot’ in temperature lasting many decades is permitted
and the requirement is only to keep long-term stabilization
temperature to no more than 2 ◦C, then emission reductions
just under 3% per annum would be viable. However, again
these would have to start with immediate effect (they cite
year 2010 as initializing such reductions). The possibility of
emissions being able to peak much later in the century than
year 2020 and still limit warming to target levels is explored
by O’Neill et al (2010). They find that this might be possible,
but it relies on potentially unachievable mitigation actions
later in the century.
Ranger et al (2012) examine year 2020 emissions ranges
compatible with a 2 ◦C warming target for alternative scenar-
ios. They consider two different aerosol forcing assumptions
to account for uncertainty in this contribution. For ‘high’
sulfate aerosol emissions, this range extended up to 54
gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions (GtCO2e yr−1), but
for a lower aerosol emission scenario and thereby ‘masking’
less global warming, this reduced to 48 GtCO2e yr−1. Ranger
et al (2012) find as might be expected, being near the top of
the range in 2020 requires emissions to fall to lower values in
2050 compared to scenarios with lower 2020 emissions, what
they refer to as a ‘reversed window’.
Others have focused on stabilization at different CO2
equivalent (CO2e; ppm) concentrations. A 450 ppm CO2e
stabilization level can be associated with a long-term
equilibrium temperature change of 2 ◦C, using a best estimate
for equilibrium climate sensitivity of 3 ◦C (Meehl et al
2007). Using an integrated assessment modelling framework,
Den Elzen et al (2007) concluded that achieving such a
stabilization level was only technically feasible if atmospheric
concentrations were allowed to temporarily overshoot before
stabilization. Even this would require global CO2e emissions
in 2020 to be no more than 0–25% above 1990 levels,
depending on the choice of baseline emissions, and 25–60%
below 1990 levels by year 2050.
Here we examine the global warming implications
of a particularly large range of potential future emission
trajectories, and so advancing on, for instance, Meinshausen
et al (2009). We adopt a warming ‘target’-based approach
by considering the year 2020 and 2050 total greenhouse
gas emissions that are consistent with limiting the risk
of exceeding 2 ◦C at any point before year 2500. Hence
for this initial analysis, although of importance, we do
not include the technical, economic or political feasibility
of proposed emissions reductions, nor do we consider the
different breakdowns of emissions by sector or by different
geographical regions (e.g. Anderson and Bows 2008, 2011).
We show how choices made for the 2020 emissions targets
have consequences for the allowable range at 2050 and
beyond. Particular emphasis is placed on embedding our
analysis in a probabilistic framework based on current
uncertainties associated with Earth system science. Results
are presented in the context of the emission reduction pledges
given in the annex to the recent Copenhagen Accord.
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2. Methods
2.1. Climate modelling
An initial set of around 150 different emissions trajectories
drive a core set of simulations. For each trajectory, ensembles
of simulations using a variant of the MAGICC climate model
provide a probability density function for the time series of
global average temperature rise. The MAGICC model has
its origins in an upwelling diffusion energy balance model
of Hoffert et al (1980) with further development by Wigley
and Raper (1992, 2001) including the depiction of the global
carbon cycle by Wigley (1993). It has been the basis for many
climate change projections, including contributions to all the
IPCC WG1 assessments to date (e.g. Cubasch et al 2001,
Meehl et al 2007). Based on the version in Wigley and Raper
(2001), the variant of MAGICC we use samples identically to
Lowe et al (2009) uncertainty in the three large scale bulk
parameters of (i) equilibrium climate sensitivity, (ii) ocean
diffusivity and (iii) a measure of the climate–carbon cycle
feedback. Each parameter is assigned nine potential values
along with an associated probability. We assume parameter
values are independent and for any parameter triplet an
overall probability can be assigned by multiplying together
the individual probabilities. (This assumption is worthy of
future investigation to see how contemporary measurements
may constrain climate models further and potentially yield
a joint distribution.) All triplet parameter possibilities are
considered, corresponding to 729 different simulations. The
MAGICC model is a simple climate model so processes are
more highly parameterized than in full general circulation
models (GCMs) used by many climate modelling centres.
Whilst losing geographical information, the simplifications
enable large numbers of simulations to be performed, which
here are the 150 core trajectories for 729 parameterizations.
However even this is time consuming and a method is
described in section 3 to interpolate our core scenario results
to a well-populated continuum of possible trajectories.
The uncertainty distribution for climate sensitivity is from
Murphy et al (2004), based on results from an ensemble
of more complex models weighted against observational
datasets from the recent past. This can be compared to
the compilations of Meehl et al (2007; their Box 10.2,
figure 1) and Meinshausen et al (2009; their figure 1(a)),
comprising 11 and 20 examples respectively. The median
of the Murphy distribution is 3.25 K and on the high
side of the spread of median values in the literature.
However this distribution is less asymmetric than others
as a result of their sampling design, lacking the ‘fat
tail’ characteristic of other distributions (Roe and Baker
2007, Knutti and Hegerl 2008). The influence of oceanic
diffusion parameterization on ability to achieve temperature
stabilization is highlighted by Johansson (2011). Here,
uncertainty in ocean diffusivity is estimated by fitting a
lognormal distribution to effective values of that quantity,
derived from different atmosphere–ocean GCMs (AOGCMs)
(Cubasch et al 2001; their table 9 A1). The climate–carbon
cycle feedback uncertainty is estimated by a normal
distribution based on the MAGICC fit to the C4MIP ensemble
(Friedlingstein et al 2006).
2.2. Specifying the target emission trajectories
Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosol
precursors are the basis of our trajectory generation,
for which climate responses with uncertainty bounds are
estimated. Around 150 core emission trajectories, defined
by four features or parameters, are inputs to the MAGICC
climate model. We set (i) two possible ‘baseline’ emissions
trajectories between 1990 and the time of the start of
mitigation measures, (ii) years of peak emissions, 2016, 2020,
2025 and 2030, (iii) post-peak CO2 emission reduction rates
covering a range of 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5% reduction per annum
and with a small number up to 10% and (iv) a long-term
emissions floor defined as ‘zero’, ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’
(0, 6, 11 and 16 GtCO2e yr−1 respectively). Here baseline
emissions are defined as an estimate of historical emissions
up to year 2000, followed by a ‘Business-as-Usual’ scenario
which assumes no explicit climate mitigation policy. CO2e
emissions are calculated using the 100 yr global warming
potential values in Schimel et al (1996). We adopt the
100 yr global warming potential as our metric to aggregate
different greenhouse gas emissions, given it is the one
currently most used in international discussions on climate
policy. Included in this aggregation are carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide and the fluorinated gases included
in the Kyoto Protocol. Other metrics exist which are more
tailored towards a temperature based target; see for instance
Shine et al (2005) and Smith et al (2012). We make the
key assumption that non-CO2 radiatively active gases follow
slightly different assumptions regarding reduction rates, but
in general they are either equal to, or a little less, than
that prescribed for CO2. The ratios between emissions of
non-CO2 greenhouse gases and CO2 are similar to those
implicit in the SRES B1 scenario (Nakic´enovic´ and Swart
2000); with emissions of gases moving together, the use of
a single aggregating metric becomes more valid. Much more
detail and rationale behind the scenario generation is given in
supplementary information (available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/
7/014039/mmedia). This includes describing our treatment of
aerosols, where the main feature is that SO2 emissions are
also related to CO2 emissions. This might be a reasonable
first-order approximation given co-generating sources.
The emissions floor value represents the concept of there
being a component of emissions that is difficult or impossible
to remove for society to function, and we assume it is
composed of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide. We
consider two baselines as there remains significant uncertainty
in the recent historical emissions, and predominantly in land
use change emissions. Recent best estimates of emissions
(Manning et al 2010) suggest that, considering across the
period years 2000–2010, we are currently on a trajectory
that falls just below the SRES A1B scenario (Nakic´enovic´
and Swart 2000). To account for this, we consider both
the A1B scenario and a second scenario with an emissions
growth rate of just 1% below, which we call A1B-1%.
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Figure 1. Three sample CO2-equivalent emissions profiles
corresponding to peak emissions in year 2020, followed by
year-on-year reductions of 1%, 3% and 5%, heading to an eventual
floor of 6 GtCO2e yr−1. Also shown are the SRES A1B baseline
emissions. The years of 2020 and 2050 are marked as vertical lines.
Peak emissions occur seven years after deviation from the
baselines. In figure 1, we illustrate three profiles where the
baseline emissions trajectory is SRES A1B, peak emissions
are in year 2020, subsequent rates of reduction are 1, 3 and
5% and the eventual emissions floor is 6 GtCO2e yr−1.
3. Results
3.1. Climate model projections
We present findings from our core simulations with the
MAGICC model. Figure 2 shows the relationship between
the median peak temperature during years 2000–2500 and
corresponding CO2-equivalent emissions for years 2020 and
2050. Emissions in year 2050 provide a better indicator of
peak warming than in 2020, as is evident in the spread along
the vertical axis of figure 2; a similar result is presented in
Bowerman et al (2011). We investigate the reportedly strong
relationship between cumulative emissions and the probability
of crossing a peak warming threshold such as 2 ◦C (Allen
et al 2009, Meinshausen et al 2009). For each trajectory,
emissions are summed for years 2000–2500, and peak
warming values recorded on this timescale for each ensemble
member associated with that trajectory. Figure 3 shows a tight
link between the probability of exceeding 2 ◦C and cumulative
CO2e emissions, despite the broad range of parameters
that define the emissions profiles. Due to the assumed
correlations between changes in non-CO2 greenhouse gases
emissions and those for CO2, then such probabilities could
also be tightly related to cumulative emissions of carbon
dioxide only. This is demonstrated in figure S1 of the
supplementary information (available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/
7/014039/mmedia), where the two cumulative calculations (of
CO2e and CO2 only) are compared. Figure 3 does separate
out a strong dependence on emissions floor, due to the longer
limits on our cumulative emission integrations (Bowerman
et al 2011 integrate to 2200 only to remove this dependence).
In figure 3, only two emissions floors (0 and 6 GtCO2e)
Figure 2. Emissions in years 2020 (red dots) and 2050 (black dots)
for each core emission trajectory with zero or low floors. This is
plotted against the median in maximum temperature rise in period
2000–2500, derived from the probabilistic ensembles for each core
trajectory. The vertical dashed line corresponds to 2 ◦C global
warming.
Figure 3. The probability of exceeding 2 ◦C of global warming
since pre-industrial times at any point during the period 2000–2500,
as a function of cumulative emissions between years 2000 and 2500
(in units of trillion i.e. 1012 tonnes of CO2e). This is for the core
emissions profiles. The different colours distinguish the long-term
emissions floors, high (16 GtCO2e yr−1), medium
(11 GtCO2e yr−1), low (6 GtCO2e yr−1) and zero (0 GtCO2e yr−1).
The red line is the curve of best fit for the low and zero floors.
(Additional available core emission scenarios following a B2 SRES
baseline emissions scenario were also included). The 50%
probability of staying below the 2 ◦C threshold is marked as the
dashed line.
are capable of reducing the probability of exceeding two
degrees to 50% or less for at least some of simulations.
For the high floors, in general temperatures just continue to
rise, crossing the 2 ◦C threshold. From our fitted regression
curves, a 50% probability of temperature rise not exceeding
2 ◦C before year 2500 corresponds to cumulative emissions of
2.63 trillion tCO2e (or 0.72 TtC) for a zero emissions floor
and 4.69 TtCO2e (1.28 TtC) for a low emissions floor, and
with the higher latter value predominantly due to the long
time-integration of the non-zero floor.
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3.2. The link between year 2020 and 2050 emissions and the
probability of remaining below two degrees of global
warming
Tight correlations evident in figure 3 between cumulative
emissions and probability of exceeding a 2 ◦C warming level
(for a given emissions floor) allow interpolation from the core
trajectories, as simulated with the MAGICC climate model,
over to many other emissions trajectories. For any emissions
trajectory and floor defined by parameter values in section 2.2,
the probability of exceeding the 2 ◦C threshold can be
related to calculation of cumulative total emissions. Such
probabilities are provided by the red best fit curves of figure 3.
This is now exploited to give a comprehensive analysis of how
attributes of different future emissions trajectories link to the
2 ◦C threshold in global warming.
We first consider emissions trajectories with a zero
emissions floor, and the A1B and A1B-1% baselines for
present day. Figure 4 shows the combinations of emissions
in years 2020 and 2050 that are possible to keep warming
below 2 ◦C, all for at least a 50% probability and for trajectory
parameters in the bounds outlined above. For different year
2020 and 2050 emissions, the top row of figure 4 provides
values of post-peak reduction rate and the middle row
shows CO2e emission peak year. We can refer to these as
emission ‘constraints’. The bottom row of figure 4 presents for
different values of 2020 and 2050 emissions, the probability
of staying below 2 ◦C. These latter values could be referred
to as emissions ‘consequences’. Figure 5 is identical to
figure 4, except that it corresponds to an emissions floor of
6 GtCO2e yr−1.
A growing number of nations, whose combined
emissions cover more than 80% of the total, have pledged
to make voluntary reductions in their emissions by 2020.
This is particularly true following the COP15 negotiations
at Copenhagen in year 2009 (UNFCCC 2009). Placed as
small vertical bars on the year 2020 axes in our panels of
figure 4 are lower (‘L’) and upper (‘U’) interpretations of
the integrated pledges made for emissions and as detailed
in the appendices of the Copenhagen Accord. The value
‘L’ presented is 46.7 GtCO2e, and this is the lower 20%
of the lower estimates. The absolute lowest value possible
from interpreting the pledges is 45.2 GtCO2e. The value ‘U’
is 57.1 GtCO2e and this is the upper 80% of such upper
estimates. The highest possible value is 60.6 GtCO2e. The
divide between upper and lower estimates reflects issues such
as whether an individual country’s pledges are conditional on
action from the rest of the world, technological transfer or
finance, or action on land use and forestry emissions (UNEP
2010).
Figures 4 and 5 provide a ‘look-up chart’ which can
be utilized in a variety of ways. In one application, it links
prescribed year 2020 and 2050 emissions with requirements
to achieve these emissions in terms of year of peak emissions,
emissions reduction rate and floor, and what is gained
i.e. percentage chance of remaining below 2 ◦C. White space
indicates where year 2020 and 2050 values are not possible
with a 50% or higher probability of staying below 2 ◦C of
global warming (e.g. very high 2050 emissions), or where the
values are beyond the parameter bounds describing possible
emissions trajectories (e.g. very low 2050 emissions).
The diagrams can be used in reverse where constraints
are prescribed (e.g. a particular level of decarbonization and
peak year), and from this implications for emissions in 2020
and 2050, along with probability of remaining below the
2 ◦C target, can be read off. Another use of the diagrams
is to prescribe different acceptable percentage levels of risk
of crossing the 2 ◦C threshold, and determining flexibility
in the balance between year 2020 and 2050 emissions.
This flexibility becomes a single aspiration for years 2020
and 2050 by stipulation of what is feasible for one of the
constraints (e.g. decarbonization rate) as more information on
that becomes available.
4. Discussion and conclusions
We relate year 2020 and 2050 emissions to attributes
of potential future emissions trajectories and associated
probabilities of exceeding the 2 ◦C threshold of global
warming since pre-industrial times. For prescribed long-term
future floor and contemporary baseline emissions, supplying
values for 2020 and 2050 emissions determines the year
of peak emissions, subsequent decarbonization rate and
probability of staying below two degrees of warming out to
year 2500.
To remain below 2 ◦C in global warming, emissions
must peak and soon, followed by significant rates of
decarbonization. Our analysis has encapsulated uncertainty in
aspects of the Earth system, thereby generating probabilistic
estimates. Across all simulations, we find the slowest rate of
decarbonization consistent with a 50% chance of exceeding
2 ◦C to be slightly below 3% per annum, where this
corresponds to the specific case of emissions peaking by year
2014 (so in fact deviation from business-as-usual would have
to have already started) and a zero emissions floor. For later
peaking, a non-zero emissions floor, a higher certainty of
remaining below the 2 ◦C threshold, or any combination of
these, then higher reduction rates are required. The difficulty
of implementing higher decarbonization rates cannot be
underestimated. Le Quere et al (2009) and others note
the continuing strong correlation between global domestic
product (GDP) and emissions.
The presence of a non-zero emissions floor significantly
reduces the emissions in both 2020 and 2050 compatible
with limiting warming to 2 ◦C with at least 50% probability.
Considering the A1B-1% scenario and only post-emission
peak reduction rates of up to 5% yr−1, the presence of
an emission floor of 6 GtCO2e yr−1 reduces the maximum
allowable 2020 emissions from around 54 GtCO2e yr−1 to
around 47 GtCO2e yr−1, and corresponding 2050 emissions
from 20 GtCO2e yr−1 to around 15 GtCO2e yr−1. It also
suggests that a slightly earlier peak in emissions might
be needed and achieving lower probabilities of crossing
the two-degree threshold (e.g. less than 30%) becomes
impossible. This suggests an importance to estimating the
extent to which emissions floors might be eliminated through
new technology, as their presence significantly reduces the
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Figure 4. For two different baseline scenarios (A1B-1% left-hand column and A1B right-hand column), and all for a zero long-term
emissions floor, presented are simultaneous constraints on emission trajectory shapes and consequences in terms of probabilities of staying
below the 2 ◦C threshold. This is all for different emissions in years 2020 (x-axes) and 2050 (y-axes). The values of 2020 and 2050
emissions where a solution exists (i.e. there is colour in the figures) all correspond to the probability of remaining below two degrees of
global warming as being 50% or greater, and where parameters defining trajectories profiles fall within the bounds given in the main body
of text. The top panels show the post-peak CO2 emissions reduction rates (%), the middle panels show the year of peak emissions and the
bottom panels show the probability of remaining below two degrees global warming up to year 2500. The ‘L’ and ‘U’ ticks indicate lower
and upper bounds of year 2020 emissions assuming the Copenhagen Accord pledges are met and based on our interpretation.
room for manoeuvre even in the near term. We also find
a strong dependence on current emissions levels, and better
understanding is required to determine these more precisely,
and where most uncertainty is associated with land use
practises. Higher contemporary emissions correspond to
lower year 2050 emissions to achieve similar probabilities of
staying below the two-degree threshold.
We place our analysis in the context of the Copenhagen
pledges (UNFCCC 2009). Complex linkages between
the pledges of individual countries means there remains
uncertainty in their implications for total emissions in year
2020. From the geometry allowed in our profiles, for the lower
A1B-1% simulations, then upper pledge values (i.e. smaller
pledged reductions) will not be attained anyway. Even if
society is following the higher A1B profile, then across the
possible pledge range, we find available solutions in order
to stay below 2 ◦C of global warming with a 50% chance
or more. However only achieving the upper part of 2020
emissions range in terms of pledge interpretation (i.e. higher
year 2020 emissions) requires larger subsequent rates of
reduction, lower year 2050 emissions and potentially lower
floors to achieve the same probability of remaining below the
2 ◦C threshold.
The precise values presented in this letter’s visualization
of keeping global warming below 2 ◦C will be refined
as better understanding of the climate system becomes
available. We have used one modelling framework, a
single climate sensitivity distribution and there remains
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Figure 5. Identical panels to those present in figure 4, except that here all correspond to an emissions floor of 6 GtCO2e yr−1.
significant uncertainty in present day and thus future
magnitude of aerosol radiative forcing (e.g. Stott et al
2008). In particular, we need to consider how sensitive
our results are to assumptions (supplementary information
available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/7/014039/mmedia) regarding
future near-constant ratios between emissions of different
greenhouse gases, and between these and aerosols. The CO2e
numbers reported here to achieve a two-degree warming limit,
for a given probability, do not include (but are nevertheless
dependent on) the assumed aerosol emissions. Despite these
uncertainties, we believe the main messages of this analysis to
be robust, providing a broad indication as to what is required
for year 2020 and 2050 emissions to remain below two
degrees of global warming for different levels of confidence.
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